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Beyond Pluralism: Foucault's Strategic
Counter to Heterosexist Categories

Ladelle McWhorter
,.......,._ ~ / ' ost nonheterosexuals want to be guaranteed civil rights with
out regard to sexual practices; nevertheless, quite often, gay
and lesbian activists formulate demands in ways that de-emphasize practice and emphasize identity. For example, instead of saying, "My having
sex with women is irrelevant to the question of whether I should have
custody of my child," a lesbian activist might say, "My lesbian identity is
as moral and healthy as heterosexual identity and therefore should not
prevent me from having custody of my child." The general claim is that
lesbian or gay personhood is as good as heterosexual personhood, so
lesbians and gays should have equal rights; our political system should
recognize and protect a plurality of identities. There are obvious reasons why demands get articulated as support for identities rather than
allowance of practices. Many people are much more willing to love the
"sinner" if they are still allowed to hate the "sin," so gays and lesbians
have formulated appeals in the ways most likely to be supported by
heterosexuals. But, when pluralism of this sort is taken as the goal the
powers supporting heterosexism go unchallenged and are even reinforced in some fundamental ways. In other words, pluralism as a political ideal may serve to oppress precisely those disprivileged or
marginalized groups who might be expected to gain most from its
realization. To make this argument, I will draw on the work of Michel
Foucault.
Using Foucault's work in this way is, I think, extremely appropriate. Until his death in 1984, Foucault participated regularly in gay politics
and theoretical discussion; in fact, virtually all of his work since 1970
can be read as political moves within gay political movements, as a
series of contributions to what I will call "gay philosophy." Certainly gay
politics is not the only background against which to read Foucault's
work, but doing so can be very interesting and productive, so much so
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that one might wonder why more people have not approached Foucault's
texts in this way. 1
One reason most people have not seen Foucault's work as unfolding within the context of gay politics is that it does not participate in
the rhetoric of pluralism. Foucault never says gay identity is just as good
as heterosexual identity. In fact, he registers suspicion of sexual identities in general and of homosexual identity in particular. 2 If gay politics
centers on the affirmation of gay identity, Foucault seell).s more like an
enemy than a comrade in struggle.
There is, however, another interpretation, namely, that Foucault is
suspicious of sexual identities in general-and therefore of pluralism~·
because he believes the notion of identity is one of the tools of normalizing power, a genus of power of which heterosexism is a species. His
attempts to undermine the power of identity can be read as an attack
on heterosexism, an attack begun at least as early as the mid-1970s and
carried on until his death. What follows is a reading of Foucault's work
on identity that makes its implications for heterosexism explicit.

SUSPICIONS OF IDENTITY
Foucault never says homosexual identity does not exist. What he says is
that it was invented in 1870 by the psychiatrist Carl Westphal (HSJ, 43).
Homosexual identity was made possible, he claims, by the transposition
of the habitual practice of sodomy "onto a kind of interior androgyny,
a hermaphrodism of the soul" (HSJ, 43). Sodomy-a catch-all term
meaning "any sexual intercourse held to be abnormal"3-is a kind of
practice. Anyone can engage in sodomy, and almost everyone has, if we
can believe Kinsey and Masters and johnson. Homosexuality, however,
is not a kind of practice, though it is strongly correlated with the tendency to engage in practices of specific kinds. Homosexuality is a way
of being a self; it is an essential component of a personality; it is an
identity.
Foucault's 1975 text Discipline and Punish induces suspicion of the
notion of individual human identity, that is, of the notion of a true self
that can be known. There Foucault argues that the identity of any
individual person, insofar as it can function as an object of knowledge,
is a site for the anchoring of disciplinary power. 4
"For a long time," Foucault writes, "ordinary individuality-the
everyday individuality of everybody-remained below the threshold of
description" (DP, 191). The only persons whose lives were chronicled
were sovereigns and heroes. Toward the end of the eighteenth century,
however, things began to change. In hospitals, schools, prisons, armies,
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and factories, functionaries began keeping detailed records of their
examinatiOJljS of each individual patient, pupil, inmate, soldier, or laborer for various purposes having mostly to do with a desire for greater
orderliness and utility. As the practices of examination and recordkeeping were standardized, two possibilities emerged: ·
firstly, the constitution of the individual as a describable,
analysable object, not in order to reduce him to "specific"
features, as did the naturalists in relation to living beings, but
in order to maintain him in his individual features, in his
particular evolution, in his own aptitudes ·or abilities, under
the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge; and, secondly,
the constitution of a comparative system that made possible
the measurement of overall phenomena, the description of
groups, the characterization of collective facts, the calculation
of the gaps between individuals, their distribution in a given
"population." (DP, 190)
This process of meticulous data collection made possible, on the one
hand, the establishment of norms and, on the other, the identification
of individuals insofar as their· behavior or performance deviated from
those norms. Knowledge gained through these methods-knowledge
of individuals' abilities and disabilities, for example-might enable
physicians, teachers, psychiatrists, or supervisors to help their charges
realize their full potential; certainly, it enabled functionaries to arrange
the individuals under their control to achieve greater efficiency in pursuit
of their institutions' goals. Thus the individual, as a being identifiable
in relation to a set of norms, becomes what Foucault calls "a 'case': a
case which at one and the same time constitutes an object for a branch
of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power" (DP, 191). What is
knowable about each of us, the truth of our individual selves, is the
history of our particular deviations from established norms. That series
of deviations, that truth, is how we are identified in a disciplinary society; it is our true identity. In potentiality, if not in actuality, each of us
is a case. And as a case, as a knowable identity, each of us is a target and
an anchor point for power.
.
Now, one might argue that the "identity" Foucault sees as an anchor point for power is not the same thing as the "identity" many gay
and lesbian activists try to affirm. Affirmation of gay identity surely is
not simply affirmation of one's deviations from sexual norms. We might
want to impose or stipulate a distinction here between individuality and
identity. We might want to say Foucault has aualyzed individuality, while
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political movements promote the acceptance of particular forms of
collective identity.
This distinction deserves careful scrutiny. Is it the case that what
Foucault critiques in Discipline and Punish is different from what gay
activists tend to embrace? Is it the case that Foucaultian individuality is
not the same as gay identity, or at least that we ought to use the two
words to distinguish two kinds of things? Perhaps so. One's individuality, which is just the set of one's deviations from relevant norms, is
one's own alone, whereas one's sexual identity is something one shares
with others. 5 If one claims a lesbian identity, one is claiming a kind of
group membership (abstract though it may be for people who are
isolated from organized gay communities). What is more important,
this act of "coming out" typically functions as a rite of passage through
which one defies society's judgment that homosexual practice is a form
of deviance and proclaims oneself to be outside heterosexist norms.
Thus, it seems affirmation of gay identity is a direct assault on normalizing power rather than an anchor point for it.
Unfortunately, that may not be so. Announcing that one's difference is not deviance need have no effect whatsoever on normalizing
power-even if the claim is heeded. As long as normalizing thinking
itself goes unchallenged, the best we can hope for is establishment of a
parallel set of norms of homosexual identity development, an event
that would leave normalizing power completely intact and would simply
make possible the identification of new forms of deviance. This is already happening to a limited extent. Occasionally, one hears people
defend homosexuality as, for some individuals at least, normal.
Normalizing power can simply absorb new identities as hew norms
against which to measure new types of deviation. Any identity can function as the name for a type of personhood for which there are known
or knowable developmental and behavioral norms. And, thus, any identity can be used to normalize and oppress those who deviate from it. 6
Setting up homosexual identity as just-as-good-as-only-different-from
heterosexual identity does nothing to challenge the powers that enable
heterosexist oppression to begin with.
It is true that the kind of identity many gay and lesbian activists
affirm is not exactly the individuality that Foucault studies. Individuality
is the name for a particular person's specific location within a normed
type, whereas identity is the name for a norm, elevated to a type of
personhood, that individuals have in common. Identity and individuality are not exactly the same thing; nevertheless, they are intimately
related. Individuals exist in relation to normed identity types. Therefore, individuality, the anchor point for power, depends upon the existence of identity types. This dependency relation is the reason Foucault
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attempts, particularly in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, to undermine
identity. lQentity is a tool of normalization, and normalization is the
source of most of our sexual misery.

ALTERNATIVE POLITICS: THE GENEALOGY OF
SEXUAL CATEGORIES
Identities are tools of power. As such, they are never, under any circumstances, completely unproblematic. Given his own analysis, Foucault
could not affirm the notion that for each of us there exists a true sexual
identity that we have only to discover and manifest, nor could he accept
a political imperative to establish a collective identity ori the basis of
which to demand legal and social change.
Nevertheless, one is given to oneself as an object of knowledge.
One stands marked out and identified as a homosexual. One must
assume that position, whether one wants to or not, in a society that
imposes that label at sites of specific recurrent desires and practices.
And in assuming that position one finds that one is oppressed. What
can one do?
One might attempt to defend one's desires and practices without
reifying them. But, while that might be a viable option in some circumstances, in the present climate it might be political suicide. Conservatives are trying to force gays and lesbians into just such a defensive
posture by claiming that homosexuality is a choice of practice, not an
aspect of personhood, and therefore is punishable. No doubt if the
terms of the debate shift in the directions conservatives desire, political
and economic oppression will intensifY and lives will be destroyed. In
addition, beyond the immediate strategic considerations, one might
balk at the notion of "defending" one's desires, pr~ctices, lifestyle, or
whatever anyway. Why assume homosexuality is the issue? Instead of
defending homosexuality, why not attack the power structures of
heterosexism outright?
That, I believe, is what Foucault seeks to do. With his critique of
normalizing power carefully laid out in Discipline and Punish, he launches
his direct attack on heterosexism in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1.
There Foucault makes his argument that homosexual identity and its
opposite, heterosexual identity, are historical products of power.
Examining the legal prohibitions against various types of "sexual
deviance." Foucault finds that prior to the eighteenth century "debauchery (extra-marital relations), adultery, rape, spiritual or carnal incest,
but also sodomy, or the mutual 'caress'" (HS1, 38) were punishable as
degrees of violation of marital fidelity. Practices that came to be called
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"homosexual" were not marked out as separate from the rest. ''What
was taken into account in the civil and religious jurisdictions alike was
a general unlawfulness. Doubtless acts 'contrary to nature' were stamped
as especially abominable, but they were perceived simply as an extreme
form of acts 'against the law'" (HSJ, 38).
All acts other than those considered appropriate for and -within
marriage were lumped together as violations of the Sixth Commandment, just more or less heinous.
Not until the nineteenth century did some of those acts come to
function as signs of the specific natures, the true identities of the persons who engage in them. The advent of sexual identity occurred with
the spread of medical and psychiatric power into the-family, the home,
and the school. Once perversity indicated an identity, every aspect of
the perverse person's life was subject to scrutiny. Foucault writes,
The nineteenth century homosexual became a personage, a
past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a
type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet
anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that
went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his
actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active
principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it
was a secret that always gave itself away. (HSJ, 43)
With this understanding of habitual action and desire as indicative of
identity, every aspect of a person's life was open to the "lines of penetration" (HSJ, 42) of a disciplinary power whose strategy generally
included a fragmentation of previous unities and a reordering for
maximal efficiency and control.
One conclusion of The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, then, is that
homosexual identity is produced by networks of power and that incitement to discover and confess one's identity is a strategy for inserting
individuals into a power-knowledge grid. Homosexual identity is not an
ahistorical essence that comes to inhabit individuals either from birth
or as a result of childhood t~auma or aberrant physiological development; it is a historical category produced within a clinical discipline for
the purpose of managing human behavior. 7 Furthermore, its genesis is
one with that of the category of heterosexual, the norm against which
the deviance is measured, but more important for Foucault, the norm
that requires its other in order to exist at all. For, without the category
of homosexuality, heterosexuality could not be. Heterosexuals are pre-
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cisely not homosexuals; they are normal. But normality exists only in
relation to something defined as deviance.
Fou\ault's target here is not homosexuality. It is heterosexuality.
It is the power that informs heterosexual identity and sets it up as
natural, unquestionable, healthy, and right. It is the network of powerknowledge that, by rigidifYing pleasurable practices into sexual essences,
compels a majority of people to imagine that they are incapable of
anything but genitality with members of another sex and superior to
anyone who might be capable of something else. Foucault's genealogy
of sexual identities disrupts heterosexist power by making the notion of
pure or natural heterosexual identity deeply suspect.
Still, uneasiness about Foucault's project may persist. Homosexual
identity has served as a ground of countermemory and counterattack.
What if we accept Foucault's analysis and cease to believe in the natural
existence of any sexual identities? How will that help us, given the
current configurations of power? It is hard for most of us to imagine a
selfhood, much less a politics, without identity as a ground, so it may
seem that Foucault leaves us with no alternativ~ except disintegration
both collective and individual-which is obviously unacceptable. In The
History of Sexuality, Volume 1 all Foucault gives in answer to the question
of how to animate a postidentity self-awareness and politics is: "the
rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality
ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures" (HSJ, 157). It was
necessary to wait eight years for a better answer than that.
Foucault's original plan for the History of Sexuality series included
five more volumes after the first, each devoted to some aspect of the
configurations of power that produced sexual subjects over the last
three hundred years. But the project changed. In the introduction to
The Use of Pleasure Foucault explains, "What I had planned ... was a
history of the experience of sexuality, where experience is understood
as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity,
and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture. "8 Problems arose with
the third correlate, specifically with the question of how to account for
individuals being led to practice a hermeneutics of desire. A genealogy
of desire was needed, an account of the centuries-long development of
the experience of selfhood as desiring subjectivity. This new project led
Foucault back to Greece and Rome. His puzzle now was "desiring man"
(UP, 6).
Genealogical work is disruptive. It shakes foundations, fractures
unity, and disturbs discursive c~ntinuity; however, it is also often a
necessary aspect of creative work. In the introduction to The Use of
Pleasure, Foucault writes, 'There are times in life when the question of
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knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive
differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on
looking and reflecting at all" (UP, 8). Given that assertion, it makes
sense to read Foucault's genealogy of desire as more than an attempt
to dislodge established theories of what it means to be a subject; it is
also an attempt to find different ways to think and live.
As Foucault cast the history of sexuality project originally, the series
would have concentrated on delineating the institutions and disciplinary practices that created subjectivities such as "the pervert," the "masturbating child," the "hysterical woman," and the "Malthusian couple."
Analyses of these forms of subjectivity no doubt would have furthered
the project of destabilizing sexuality and sexual identities, the foundations of heterosexism, but these analyses would not have provided much
opportunity to explore ways of thinking and living one's gay practice in
the absence of the identity of homosexual. The turn to Greece and
Rome did just that.
Foucault suggests that every morality comprises two elements:
"codes of behavior and forms of subjectivation" (UP, 29). In some
moral systems, the codes predominate; but in others, what takes precedence is "the practices of the self' (UP, 30). "Here the emphasis is
on the forms of relations with the self, on the methods and techniques by which [one] works them out, on the exercises by which
[one] makes of [one]selfan object to be known, and on the practices
that enable [one] to transform [one's] own mode of being" (UP, 30).
This latter type of morality is what Foucault encounters in GrecoRoman antiquity.
According to Foucault, the Greeks understood desire not primarily as attraction ,toward what one lacks but as part .of a dynamic
net'
work that included act and pleasure. Desire arises out of knowledge
that certain acts bring pleasures of a certain kind; the possibility of
pleasure lures desire toward act, and act results in pleasure, which
results, once again, in desire. This network is an energeia (UP, 50). As
such it ·empowers human being, but it may, because of its very nature
as force, get out of control. One must, therefore, both .cultivate and
guard it. The purpose of moral reflection, then,
was much less to establish a systematic code that would determine the canonical form of sexual acts, trace out the
boundary of the prohibitions, and assign practices to one
side or the other of a dividing line, than to work out the
conditions and modalities of a "use"; that is, to define a style
for what the Greeks called chresis aphrodision, the use of pleasures. (UP, 53)
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In fact, the form of sexual acts-the sex of one's partner, whether
indeed q1ere was a partner at all-was not the issue. What mattered was
the frequency and circumstances under which one made use of pleasure to strengthen oneself and take care of one's needs. The goal was
sophrosyne, moderation, the enhancement of one's strength in the reasoned mastery of the dynamic, of desire, pleasure, and act.
Thus, Foucault shows us a culture in which desires and practices
otir society labels "sick" and "immoral" were neither and were not even
distinguished from desires and practices our society considers healthy
and right. His main purpose was to begin to give a genealogical account of our own attitudes about sexual practices and our own beliefs
about sexual identities. But in the process of doing that, he also has
managed to depict an alternative, and, more important for my thesis,
an alternative that enables the practices we know as gay in the absence
of homosexual identity.
Foucault's work is a form of political activity. While he decidedly
did not advocate a return to ancient Greece, 9 he clearly did advocate
a turn to an ethics of self-aware forms of subjectivation as opposed to
~n ethics of the code. 10 He envisioned a morality in which those persons affected by the values and standards of a society have "the liberty
to transform the system. "II "Restrictions have to be within the reach of
those affected by them so that they at least have the possibility of altering them." 12 He imagined ethics as an art ofliving, an art in which each
would participate as artist. 13 This turn to ethics as art was, for Foucault,
directly linked to affirmation~ of gay practice. In an interview just prior
to publication of The Use of Pleasure Foucault remarked, "One could
perhaps say there is a 'gay style' or at least that there is an ongoing
attempt to recreate a certain style of existence, a form of existence or
art of living, which might be called 'gay.' "14 Thus, Foucault's work
opep.s the way for, among .other things, affirmation ,af gay ethoi, beautiful gay styles, without insistence on normalizing identity categories,
and thus his work is a political act in support of the well-being of
nonheterosexual people. The work also embodies a politico-discursive
strategy that might replace gay and lesbian identity politics and the call
for liberal pluralism.

IDENTITY VS. STYLE

How are we to live that opening, to move into postidentity self-awareness
and postidentity politics? First, we must recognize the instability of sexual
identities~ they simply are not what they claim to be. Undergoing the
inadequacy of identity categories reduces their power to shape our lives. 15
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Loss of the power of identity will be nothing but loss, however,
unless some other forces are enabled by it. Destabilization of sexual
categories is merely destructive unless some .other mode of living is
imaginable. For Foucault, the decentering of identity occurs along with
the shift to a language of style. His word style, Foucault notes, 16 is to be
understood in relation to Nietzsche's comment in The Gay Science. There
Nietzsche writes,
One Thing is Needful.-To "give style" to one's character-that
is a grand and rare art! He who surveys all that his nature
presents in its strength and in its weakness, and then fashions
it into an ingenious plan, until everything appears artistic and
rational, and even the weaknesses enchant the eye-exercises
that admirable art. 17
Life becomes not a process of self-discovery but rather a process of selftransformation. That process both produces and is "style" and is for
Foucault both individual and collective.
Perhaps we can understand style more clearly by noti.ng some of
its limits. First, one cannot create styles ex nihilo without historical
·grounding. A self, having no essential nature, does not exist apart from
discursive practice, so one cannot simply abandon the discursive practice in which one finds oneself. One cannot, for example, simply decide
one is not homosexual. Stylings elaborate on self-formative practices
and so may modifY both the practices and the self, but stylings are
never simply chosen as a Rawlsian subject behind the veil of ignorance
might choose a set of governmental rules.
Furthermore, styling is not simply alternative identity production.
Foucault is not advocating something like the construction of lesbian
identity advocated by, for example, Barbara Solomon. 18 Whereas for
Solomon the creation of a lesbian life is something like the creation of
an identity that will take a certain predetermined form and perdure in
a relatively stable manner, for Foucault as for Nietzsche, "style" never
means anything like a finished product that one would simply live out
or display. One does not create a truth of oneself that one subsequently
comes to inhabit. Style, as a configuration of "will to power," is never
completely coincident with itself; style is a kind of self-patterning energy.
What fascinates Foucault, what he advocates and attempts to practice, is a kind of ongoing "styling" that he calls "gay"-which is, to be
sure, a child of clinical discourse and normalizing power but which is
not bound to repeat the past. To be gay, then, is not to have a specific
identity either congenital, chosen, or socially produced; it is to be
engaged in a certain kind of cultural, discursive, meaningful activity
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made possible in part by and to some extent destructive and parodic of
nineteenth-century sexological discourse. 19 Understood in this sense,
gay styling is not something yet to be produced; it is already occurring-has been occurring since soon after Westphal did his work. As a
result of a set of historical forces, self-patterning, dynamic gay cultures
have formed and are forming-and have passed or are passing away.
We need posit no ahistorical identity to account for the emergence and
power of gay styles as political and cultural forces.
If we want an example of gay style, we need look no further than
the texts examined here. Foucault's work is a response to. the gay imperative to challenge heterosexism, and as such it is an acceptance of
the invitation to participate in the ongoing creation of gayness, of gay
style. It is a direct, sustained attack on heterosexism-and thus it supports gayness-but it is not thereby a simple affirmation of homosexuality. This latter point is extremely significant. Foucault's work, as he
himself says in the introduction to The Use of Pleasure, is askesis, a series
of exercises designed· to change those who undergo them. Thus his
work is antithetical to stasis, to the affirmation of anything self-identical. It is styling, ongoing, changing self-styling; it is Foucault's own selfstyling, his own shaping of himself within gay discourse. Hence my
assertion that Foucault's work itself is gay; it is an effect of gay style.
Further, within Foucault's gay styling, his strategic counter to
heterosexism, "gay" becomes an anti-identity, a name for resistance to
the finality of definition, a perpetual transgression of sexual categories.

CONCLUSION
Foucault once made a remark that this chapter is intended to echo:
"Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we,are, but to refuse
what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to
get rid of this kind of political 'double bind,' which is the simultaneous
individualization and totalization of modern power structures."20
Maybe the best course of action nowadays is not to work for the
political recognition of a plurality of sexual identities but rather to
bring the entire notion of sexual identity into question. Maybe only by
doing so will we undermine the normalizing powers that oppress all of
us together and each of us in his or her own isolated, individual way.
Political acceptance of a plurality of sexual identities may serve the
interests of those who will instantiate the new norms perfectly, those
against whom new deviants will be identified, but it is not likely to
undermine heterosexist power structures fundamentally because it will
not undermine heterosexuality as a norm for the majority of the
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population and it will not prevent the label of deviant from continuing
to be applied to someone, if not all the same someones who bore it
before. Our goal should not be to win public acceptance of a plurality
of sexual identities; it should be to challenge the notion of sexual
identity per se and heterosexual identity in particular.
Having shown that Foucault's work calls pluralism into question in
gay and lesbian politics, I want to conclude with two other, related
points. First, though on the basis of the foregoing analysis I cannot
make specific claims about the value of pluralis~ as a political goal in
other social movements, I do want to suggest that feminists ought to
consider Foucault's arguments as carefully as lesbians and gays should.
As plenty oflesbians know, the identity "woman," even when construed
as equal to "man," serves a normalizing function that oppresses many
people. Establishment of two parallel but equal norms of gender identity development does nothing to counter the oppressive power of
normalizing thinking. Affirming a plurality of genders will not end
gender oppression. Similar arguments might be made against pluralism
in other spheres.
Second, I want to emphasize that I have read Foucault's work in
the context of gay political and intellectual activity, a context in which
that work was conceived and written. Reading Foucault against that
background is both an obvious strategy and a productive one. Too
often Foucault's writing is extracted from its political context, and as a
result absurd charges are made. For example, some assert that Foucault's
work disables political practice, or that it amounts to a quietism that
preserves the status quo, or that Foucault offers nothing to feminists
because he avoids questions of gender. Only when we refuse to acknowledge Foucault's philosophy as gay can sucb charges sound even
remotely plausible. Only when we refuse to acknowledge the political
force of his work on behalf of himself and others as nonheterosexual
people does the work seem apolitical-only when we refuse to acknowled{i;j
the work's political force does it seem apolitical. But is that really a surprising
outcome? It is time to lay these assertions to rest and to acknowledg~
Foucault's political context. It is time for politically concerned intelle~~)
tuals to pay attention to what Foucault's work is doing and has to sa::j
Foucault is not the enemy; he is a comrade in struggle.

ABBREVIATIONS OF FOUCAULT'S WORKS
(NUMBERS IN NOTES REFER TO TEXT SECTIONS)
DP

Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan
(New York: Vintage Press, I977).
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HSJ

The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert
Hurley (New York: Random House, 1978).

UP

The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume 2, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1985).

NOTES
1. One who has is historian Jerrold Seigel, "Avoiding the Subject: A
Foucaultian Itinerary," journal of the History of Ideas, 51, no. 2 (April-June 1990):
273-99. Seigel writes, "I believe that there is a hidden level of· homosexual
reference in many of Foucault's writings, and that bringing it into the open will
help to clarify certain dimensions of his views about subjectivity; at the same
time it will allow us to understand the connection between the works for which
Foucault is famous, from Madness and Civilization through his studies of sexuality, and an earlier phase in his career which has been too little considered but
which casts his well-known works in a somewhat different light" (275). This
chapter will not take the same approach as Seigel, but I do recommend his
article for anyone seriously interested in this issue in Foucault's work. Foucault
discusses his sexual self-understanding and practice in a variety of publications,
e.g., "Sexual Choice, Sexual Act: Foucault and Homosexuality," in Politics, Philosophy, Culture (New York: Routledge, Chapman, Hall, 1988): 286-303; this
interview originally was published in Salmagundi, 58-59 (Fall 1982-Winter 1983)
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